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It has been frequently remarked, that it  seems to have been
reserved  to the people  of this  country, by their conduct  and
example, to decide the important question, whether societies of
men are really capable or not of establishing good government
from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined
to  depend  for  their  political  constitutions  on  accident  and
force.'
-The Federalist  No. 1
The spate of constitutional advice  giving over the past decade or
two  seems  to  have  taken  only  part  of Alexander  Hamilton's
observation to heart. Advice givers appear to believe that they can
help  others  establish  good  government  by reflection  and  choice.
They  appear  to  ignore  Hamilton's  suggestion  that the ability  to
establish  good  government  in that manner  was  reserved  to  the
people of the United States. True, the U.S. experience came early in
the  constitution-writing  enterprise,  and  accumulated  wisdom
is-one might think-more  widely available  today than it  was in
1787. And yet one might reflect as well on the fact that Hamilton's
characterization  of the proposed U.S. Constitution was inaccurate
even when it  was offered:  The Constitution's drafters embedded a
large  number  of  essentially  unprincipled  compromises  in  the
document they forwarded to the people for ratification, occasionally
but not always dressing them up in the garments of "reflection and
choice" as a tactic aimed at inducing support for the proposal.
* William  Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Philipp
Dann, Vicki Jackson, Miguel Schor, and Adrian Vermeule  for their comments.
1.  THE FEDERALIST No.1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2003).
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My aim in this short Essay is to revive Hamilton's qualification,
shorn of course of its ethnocentricity. I suggest that what primarily
determines  the  content  of constitutions  are  the  intensely  local
political  considerations  "on the  ground" when  the constitution  is
drafted,2 and therefore that normative recommendations about what
"should"  be  included  in  a  constitution  or  constitution-making
process are largely pointless.3 Scholars can accumulate information
about constitutions and their drafting and try to draw inferences
about what  will work. Yet, predicating normative  advice on such
studies  is  hazardous  at  best.4  The  number  of  observations-
examples used to generate broader propositions-in the studies are
inevitably small.5  Perhaps they can  support conclusions  that are
statistically  significant,  but,  as  serious  scholars  understand,
statistical significance is not the same as social significance.
2.  This Essay is limited to the subject of this Symposium--constitution  drafting in post-
conflict  situations where  conflict between contending parties-typically, supporters  of the
prior regime and insurgents who achieved enough success to force negotiations-persists in
the constitution-drafting process even if it has diminished substantially in other venues. See
infra  text accompanying notes  68-70.
3.  For  a  similar  expression  of  skepticism,  see  Heinz  Mug,  Constitution-making,
Democracy and the "Civilizing"  of Irreconcilable Conflict: What Might  We  Learn from  the
South African Miracle?, 25 Wis. INT'L L.J. 269 (2007).  See also id. at 270-71:
[M]y methodological  claim [is] that learning from deeply textured examples  is
more useful than the rigid application of models that may exacerbate existing
conflicts....  [T]he advisor or informed participant must be constantly aware  of
the danger that they or other participants in any particular transitional process
will transform  a context-laden  example into a  model they wish to advance  in
order to achieve a specific advantage or strategic goal in the inevitably difficult
process of negotiating a new dispensation.
4.  I regard this Essay as in the tradition of David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars
in Self-Estrangement:  Some Reflections on the Crisis  in Law and Development Studies in the
United States, 1974 WiS.  L. REV.  1062, although based on less personal  involvement in the
advice-giving project.
5.  Donald  Lutz,  whose  empirical  studies  use  around  eighty  observations,  cautions
against using such studies "to provide a master plan or a set of blueprints":
There are  too  many  variables,  most  of  which  are not  susceptible to  human
control;  ... the connections between  independent and dependent variables  are
often so imperceptible and far removed that they cannot be effectively utilized;
... and the human ability to create and learn new responses can make formerly
important variables irrelevant, and attempts at control counterproductive.
DONALD  S.  LUTZ,  PRINCIPLES  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  DESIGN  19  (2006);  see also id.  at  183
("Constitutionalism and constitutional design are not defined by some set of principles that
can be ... mechanically applied.").
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In addition, normative advice will often have something like what
Adrian Vermeule calls a "self-defeating" character.6 Effective advice
must  be  compatible  with the political  incentives  that the advice
receivers  have. Yet those  same  incentives  operate  to  induce  the
advice receivers  to search for solutions to their political problems;
for  example,  for  institutional  designs  on  which  they  and  their
opponents can agree. One has to wonder whether external advisors
or  expert  participants  can  bring  to  the  attention  of  politically
significant  figures information  that was not  already  available  to
them,7  or that, if previously unavailable,  will be fed into the local
political context as the basis for rational deliberation rather than
strategic  maneuvering.8  I  proceed  anecdotally,  with  a  series  of
informal examples designed as provocations, although each is based
on evidence.9
6.  Adrian  Vermeule,  Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman  on  Emergency Powers, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 631, 631 (2006).
7.  In a comment  made at the Symposium  at which this Essay was presented in draft
form, Vicki Jackson observed that there have been innovations  in constitutional  design in
recent years, and that some participants in a particular constitution-making process may be
unaware of these new possibilities. One example is weak-form judicial review; another is the
use of nondomestic  judges on domestic  constitutional  courts in the aftermath  of conflicts
leaving each side suspicious of anyone associated with the other. I regard this as suggesting
some  information-provision  possibilities  for external  advice  givers.  In  addition, in  some
polities,  expertise  might  be  quite  thin. Professional  elites  may  not  exist  in substantial
numbers, or may remain in exile during the constitution-making process, or may be available
disproportionately  to one side in the discussions. Local elites may not have a sufficiently wide
knowledge base about institutional solutions to the political problems they face. Eventually,
though,  and I think in most real-world settings, there is a great deal of common knowledge
available to the domestic participants without prodding from outside advisors.
8.  One can offer normative design advice on quite a high level of abstraction. Something
like this-M-'?ake sure that the institutions you create give those who lose particular political
contests incentives to continue to engage in political contention over other issues"-is going
to  be  good  advice  generally,  although  even  here  I  would  wonder  about  its  force  if the
particular contest at issue is one that the losing side believes to be essential to its continued
existence. But this advice is unlikely to provide much guidance on questions about the specific
structure of the legislative and executive branches.
9.  I should emphasize that my position is one of skepticism, not of opposition. I do not
rule out the possibility that normative advice giving might sometimes be helpful. Perhaps my
skepticism could be taken as a suggestion for a different research project: not an inquiry into
what  works  well  and what  works  badly,  but into  the  conditions  under which  advice  is
profitably taken,  under which it  is taken and transformed,  and  under which  it is simply
ignored.WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
I. AN INTRODUCTORY EXAMPLE AND  SOME  COMMENTS ON WHY
ADVICE  IS SOUGHT AND  GIVEN
A useful starting point is the argument made by Cass Sunstein
in  the  early  1990s,  with  reference  to  the  ongoing  processes  of
constitutional  drafting  and development  in Central  and Eastern
Europe.0  Sunstein  argued  that the  new  constitutions  in  those
nations  should  not  include  protections  for  social  and  economic
rights."  Sunstein began with the assumption that new democracies
had to enforce  the first- and second-generation  rights included in
their constitutions through the courts, and he worried that citizens
would not be able to distinguish between those rights and the third-
generation  social  and  economic  rights. 2  It  followed,  Sunstein
believed, that constitutional courts would have to enforce constitu-
tionally protected social and economic rights.'3
Sunstein's argument continued with the point that constitutional
courts would either take those protections seriously or they would
not, and whichever course the nation followed posed a danger to the
successful transition to a market-oriented democracy.'4 If constitu-
tional  courts  took the protections  seriously,  there  would be  two
adverse  consequences.  First, enforcement of social and economic
rights-for  example,  rights to  a  decent wage  or to  decent  hous-
10.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Against  Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POST-COMMUNIST
APPLICATION  225,  225-32  (Andr~s Saj6  ed.,  1996)  [hereinafter  Sunstein, Against Positive
Rights]. An earlier version  of the argument  appeared  in Cass  Sunstein, Against Positive
Rights, 2 E.  EuR. CONST.  REV. 35 (1993);  see also Stephen Holmes & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Politics  of Constitutional  Revision in Eastern  Europe, in RESPONDING  TO IMPERFECTION:  THE
THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  OF CONSTITUTIONAL  AMENDMENT  275  (Sanford Levinson  ed.,  1995)
(discussing the effects of amendment processes on the citizenry's sense of political efficacy).
11.  See Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, supra note 10, at 225.
12.  Id. at 229-30.  Terminology  here  is  sometimes  a  problem.  By  "first- and  second-
generation rights," I mean the rights to civil and political participation, protected in classical
liberal political theory, bolstered by guarantees of equality that were often lacking when the
basic rights were first protected. By "third-generation rights,"  I mean social  and economic
rights, but I do not exclude cultural rights from that category because, at least for present
purposes,  nothing turns  on  whether  cultural  rights  are  included  or  excluded  from  the
category.
13.  See id. at 229 (stating that it is "unrealistic to expect courts to enforce many positive
rights").
14.  See id. at 228 (noting that courts would have to oversee labor markets to enforce right-
to-work laws).
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ing-would interfere with the transition  to a market economy,  in
which some would inevitably find themselves with unattractive jobs
and bad housing, because of the interaction  among their human-
capital  endowments,  their  choices,  and the  market  demand  for
labor."  Second, such enforcement would interfere with the develop-
ment of a sense of democratic efficacy within a populace that had,
for several generations,  been denied the power to affect economic
outcomes  through political  action.  Enforcing  social and economic
rights would shift power  from the people's representatives  to the
courts. 6
Suppose, though, that constitutional  courts did not take social
and economic  rights seriously. Again, there might be two adverse
consequences.  Within the court system  as  a whole, judges  might
observe  that the constitutionally  guaranteed  social and economic
rights had no substantial legal effects, and might conclude that, as
a matter of law, the constitutionally guaranteed first- and second-
generation rights should have exactly the same legal status-that
is,  should  also have  no  substantial  legal effect. 7 And within  the
populace  the nonenforcement  of textually guaranteed  social  and
economic  rights would perpetuate the cynical view, built up over
prior  generations,  that constitutions  were  merely  paper,  having
nothing to do with the lives people actually led.'"
Constitution drafters in Central and Eastern Europe did not take
Sunstein's advice.  Guarantees of social and economic  rights were
included in essentially all the constitutions adopted in the 1990s.'9
With what effects? None whatever--or at least no systematic effects.
Some  nations  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  made  the  dual
transition to markets and democracy relatively easily, others with
more difficulty, and on a few the jury is still out. The one thing we
know, though, is that the inclusion of social and economic rights in
a  nation's  constitution  had  none  of the  systematic  effects  that
Sunstein predicted.
15.  See id.
16.  See id.
17.  See id.
18.  See id. at 229.
19.  See, e.g.,  BULG. CONST. art. 48 (guaranteeing a right to work, safe working conditions,
and  a minimum  wage);  HUNG.  CONST.  art. 70/B  (guaranteeing  a right  to  work and paid
holidays);  SLOVK. CONST.  art. 35(3) (guaranteeing all citizens the right to work).
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What can we conclude from this example?  I offer one normative
and  one  positive  observation.  Sunstein  was  mistaken  in  part
because of a failure of imagination. Writing in the early 1990s, he
assumed that constitutional courts would have to engage in what I
have  called strong-form judicial  review,  in which judicial  orders
with respect to social and economic rights are strongly prescriptive
and  detailed.2 °  Constitutional  designers  and  implementers,  in-
cluding constitutional courts, developed alternative forms of  judicial
review and implemented them in the context of social and economic
rights. 21  It  turned out that constitutional  courts could take social
and economic rights seriously without inevitably interfering with
either the transition to a market economy or the development  of a
sense of political efficacy  among the citizenry. The more  general
point here is that normative advice is inevitably predicated on how
constitutional  designs  have  worked,  and  it  may  turn  out  that
constitutional designers and implementers are more ingenious than
one might have thought.
The  positive  point  is  that  Sunstein's  advice  was  basically
irrelevant  to his  seemingly  intended  audience.  Any constitution
adopted in the 1990s would have guarantees of social and economic
rights no matter what a normative advice  giver said. Throughout
Europe-and including Central and Eastern Europe-social demo-
cratic ideas had penetrated deeply into constitutional consciousness.
Social  democratic,  Christian  democratic,  and  Communist parties
had  made  the  language  of  social  and  economic  rights  common
currency  in  the political  arena.  Proposing  to  omit guarantees  of
social and economic rights would have been understood as proposing
to  return  to  the late nineteenth century, not as proposing to join
the  twentieth.  International  instruments,  which  were  generally
20.  For my most complete discussion of this  assumption and related  issues, see MARK
TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG  RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND  SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN
COMPARATIVE  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008).
21.  For  an  important  discussion  dealing  with  Hungary,  see  Kim  Lane  Scheppele,  A
Realpolitik Defense of Social Rights, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1921,  1941-49 (2004). The case of South
Africa  is  more  widely  discussed.  See,  e.g.,  Mark  Tushnet,  Welfare Rights and Forms of
Judicial  Review, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1895,  1903-08 (2004) (explaining that the celebrated case of
Government of the Republic of South Africa v.  Brootboom provides a  good  example  of the
constitutional  court  rejecting  one  version  of  strong  substantive  rights).  Sunstein
acknowledged  that the  development  of weak-form  review  cast  some doubt  on  his earlier
argument in CASS SUNSTEIN,  DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 236-37 (2001).
1478 [Vol. 49:1473NORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL  ADVICE
characterized  as  part of the new  law of human rights,  protected
social and economic rights. 22 Perhaps only someone from the United
States, with its weak social democratic tradition, 23 could think that
new  constitutions  could  actually  omit  protections  for  social  and
economic rights. The precise contours of politics varied from nation
to nation, of course, but everywhere the political context was such
that new constitutions would include such protections.
Taking this anecdote  as a starting point, I now speculate about
why  advice  of this  sort  is  sought  and  given.  We  should think
about both supply and demand. The supply side is, I think, rather
uninteresting.  Participating  in  constitution-drafting  projects  is
intrinsically  interesting  to  scholars  of  constitutional  law,  and
opportunities  to do  so arise infrequently. And there is always the
psychic  charge  that  comes  with  the possibility of being regarded
as a James  Madison  for our times. The institutions that finance
scholars' advice  giving may do so  for purely academic  reasons,  to
gain credibility within the scholars'  own nations, or-more inter-
estingly-to gain influence in the nation receiving the advice. This
last interest may be in influencing the shape of the new constitution
or in gaining some credit for assisting in creating the constitution,
to be cashed in later.
On the  demand  side,  we  should distinguish  between  external
demand, that is, demand from non-domestic participants that the
domestic constitution makers consult external experts, and internal
demand.  I  include  within  the  category  of  "external"  demand,
demand  nominally  from  domestic  participants  induced  by  non-
domestic forces.24 In many situations, external forces-nations such
as  the  United  States,  which  are  important  sources  of external
capital,  and organizations  such  as the United  Nations-think  it
22.  According to the United Nations High Commissioner  on Human Rights, "[t]here are
nine core international human rights treaties," one of which is the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Human Rights Bodies, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies?Pages?Human
RightsBodies.aspx  (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
23.  TUSHNET, supra note 20, at 228.
24.  For a  more elaborate typology,  developed largely though not exclusively to assist in
assessing the normative validity of constitutions drafted under external influence, see Philipp
Dann & Zaid Al-Ali, The Internationalized  Pouvoir Constituant-Constitution-Making  Under
External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor, in  10 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK  OF UNITED
NATIONS LAW 423 (Armin von Bogdandy & Riidiger Wolfrum  eds., 2006).
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important  that  a  new  domestic  constitution  have  input  from
external  advice  givers.2"  Why they  do so is irrelevant.  Satisfying
their desires can have real payoffs. Some may be literal payoffs, if
the external forces are  willing to  provide material  support to the
new  government  only if its  constitution  is drafted  with external
advice. Others may be less tangible, such as enhanced credibility for
the new government on the international scene.
An interest in credibility  may create  some  internal demand as
well.  Political elites who  agree  to  deals  embedded  in a  proposed
constitution  may  be  able  to  pacify  some  domestic  opposition  by
pointing  to  the  fact  that the  deals  had  the  endorsement  of,  or
perhaps even were suggested by, external advisors-and were not,
in particular, the result of self-dealing by the constitution drafters
alone. At the same time, though, provisions developed under the eye
of or attributed to external advisors might have less credibility than
purely  domestic  provisions. 2"  Suspicious  citizens,  and  political
leaders  who believe  that they will  do worse  under  the proposed
constitution than under other possible designs (or if the status quo
persists),  may  see  the  external  advisors  as  sources  of external
influence."  These  groups  may believe that the advisors  work for
some foreign entity, and that the provisions they propose or endorse
serve the interests of their masters.28 And this belief may be well-
founded,  given  the  possibility  that  the  advice  is  being  supplied
precisely in order to gain influence.
25.  At the extreme, external "advice" can take the form  of imposition by external forces,
such as an occupying power. For a discussion of the distinction between "heteronomous" (that
is, imposed) and "autonomous" constitutions, see Jean L. Cohen,  The Role of International
Law  in  Post-Conflict Constitution-Making: Toward  a  Jus  Post  Bellum  for  "Interim
Occupations," 51  N.Y.L. SCH.  L. REv.  496 (2006-2007).  Cohen treats these  as dichotomous
categories, see id. at 498 n.2, but it is not incompatible with her analysis to treat them as lying
at the ends of a continuum.
26.  For some examples, see Dann & Al-Ali, supra  note 24, at 457-60.
27.  Id.
28.  My personal anecdotal support for this proposition comes from a consultation in which
I participated on the development of the first post-Ceaucescu  constitution for Romania. The
group of consultants was sponsored by the American Bar Association's  Central and Eastern
Law Initiative. At a press briefing, the group was asked, among other things, questions whose
clear subtexts  were, "Are you shills for the United States government?"  and "Are you shills
for the Romanian  Communist Party?" See also id. (discussing impact of external advisors).
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II. PROBLEMS WITH ADVICE ABOUT SUBSTANCE AND STRUCTURE
The failure of imagination about constitutional design possibili-
ties has a cousin-the recommendation that constitution designers
include specific institutional and substantive provisions, identified
at such a high level of generality that the recommendation  can be
accepted without consequence-by  which I mean, without adverse
consequences  to  any  politically  significant  element  in  the
constitution-making  process. Here the advice will be followed, but
only because doing so is free.29
Consider two topics for constitutional design, one substantive and
one  institutional.  As  with  social  and  economic  rights,  modern
constitutions  will include protections  for first- and second-genera-
tion rights, such as those included in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. 3" Yet including such rights in a constitu-
tion  tells  one  essentially  nothing  about  whether  a  society  will
actually have a robust culture of free speech or equality. The reason
is, in part, that some constitutions are simply shams.3' Whether a
constitutional provision has life on the ground depends not on what
the  constitution's  text  guarantees  but  rather  on  whether  the
political  forces  in  the  society  are  arrayed  in  a  way  that  gives
politically significant figures an interest in assuring that the rights
are respected. Even where constitutions are not shams, though, the
range of permissible interpretations of first- and second-generation
rights is wide enough to encompass quite large variations in actual
behavior. 2
29.  If I knew enough economics,  I would describe the advice to which I am referring as
"cheap talk."
30.  See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art. 19(2), Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.  171,  178 (guaranteeing to all the right to freedom of expression).
31.  See Charles M. Fombad, Challenges to Constitutionalism  and Constitutional  Rights
in Africa and the Enabling  Role of Political  Parties:  Lessons and Perspectives  from Southern
Africa, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 20 (2007) (noting how the  lack of independent review of laws
leads to sham constitutions).
32.  Consider, for example, that the general limitations clause of the Canadian Charter of
Rights  guarantees  rights  subject  to  "such  reasonable limits  prescribed  by  law  as can be
demonstrably justified in a free  and democratic  society."  Canadian Charter  of Rights and
Freedoms, § 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982,
ch.  11  (U.K.). The  Canadian Supreme  Court has interpreted  this clause in  a manner  that
reduces the number of situations in which rights restrictions are constitutionally permissible,
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Perhaps  structural  provisions  are  different.  With  respect  to
judicial  review,  however,  I  am  skeptical.  In  the  modern  world
constitutions will almost inevitably include  some form of constitu-
tional review.3 3 We know, though, that the design possibilities are
quite large.  Since the early years of the twentieth century some of
the  design issues  have been apparent:  Should the  constitutional
court be specialized in constitutional law, or a generalist court with
jurisdiction over constitutional questions as well as other matters?
Should constitutional review be centralized in a constitutional court,
or diffused throughout the judicial system?  Should constitutional
review be case-specific only, or should there be some sort of advisory
jurisdiction?  If there is an  advisory jurisdiction,  should  it  be  the
exclusive mode of constitutional review?  How many judges should
sit on the constitutional court, and how long should their tenure be?
And,  since  the late  twentieth  century,  a  new  question  has  been
added: Should constitutional review be strong-form, on the model of
the  United  States  and Germany, or  weak-form,  on the  model of
Canada and Great Britain?
I am similarly skeptical with respect to the separation of powers
structure. An advisor can certainly note that contemporary constitu-
tions ought to be committed to some form of separation of powers. 34
But the separation of powers comes in various large-scale forms. In
but other, less protective interpretations are clearly possible. See R. v. Oakes, [1986]  S.C.R.
103 (Can.); see also ICCPR  art. 19 (3), supra  note 30, at 178, which qualifies the right to free
expression in these terms:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with
it  special  duties  and  responsibilities.  It  may  therefore  be  subject  to certain
restrictions,  but  these  shall  only  be  such  as  are  provided  by  law  and  are
necessary:  (a)  For respect of the rights or reputations  of others;  (b)  For the
protection  of national  security  or of public order  (ordre public), or  of public
health or morals.
33.  Systems of pure parliamentary  supremacy are clearly in retreat, with New Zealand,
Great Britain, and Israel all having instituted some form of judicial review since  1990. See
Gordon  Silverstein,  Sequencing the  DNA  of  Comparative Constitutionalism:  A  Thought
Experiment, 65 MD. L. REv. 49, 49 & n.2 (2006).  Only Australia holds out. See Miguel Schor,
Squaring  the Circle:  Democratizing  Judicial  Review and  the Counter-Constitutional  Difficulty,
16  MINN.  J.  INiVL L. 61,  101  n.249  (2007).  I  put aside  constitutional revision processes  in
authoritarian regimes such as China.
34.  Even reasonably pure parliamentary systems can incorporate important separation
of powers elements. For a discussion, see  Bruce A. Ackerman, The New Separation  of  Powers,
113  HARv.  L. REv. 633  (2000); see also LItz, supra note 5,  at  109-10  (describing common
methods of modyifing parliamentarism  to incorporate some separation of powers).
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addition, nearly  all advisors would agree that modest departures
from  pure  separation  of  powers  principles-the  allocation  of  a
concededly  legislative  power  to  the  executive,  for  example-are
sometimes acceptable and even desirable. 5  Even more, sometimes
people will disagree over the basic characterization of a power, and
so over its proper allocation.3"
Proponents of specific choices will offer reasons for their preferred
choice. Those reasons will have two characteristics. First, they will
almost  certainly  be  connected,  I  suspect  fairly  strongly,  to  the
nation's legal tradition. In the civilian tradition, legal interpretation
is conceptualized as far more formal and deductive than it is in the
common  law tradition. 37  That conceptualization  has generated  a
sense  in  those  who  design constitutions  in nations with  civilian
traditions that constitutional  review should be concentrated  in a
constitutional court whose judges will be chosen in a way to make
them at least somewhat more purposive and less deductive than the
judges in the ordinary courts.38 Reflection and choice play a smaller
role than tradition, and advice that is in tension with tradition may
have little purchase.
Second,  the  reasons  offered  to  explain  design  choices  will
generally be cast in terms of the consequences  of one or the other
choice. Yet,  once  consequences  are in  the  picture,  so  is  politics.
Among  the things  on which  constitution  makers  will  reflect  are
possible outcomes of the controversies they have in mind. True, they
are designing a constitution that they hope will have some staying
power and will allow the nation's institutions to address problems
of which the designers are at present unaware. But they also know
35.  For  example,  the  U.S.  separation  of  powers  system  departs  from  purity  in  the
President's  power  to veto  legislation,  which is the  allocation of a legislative  power  to the
executive, and in the Senate's role in the appointment of executive officials.  See U.S.  CONST.
art. I, § 7; U.S.  CONST.  art. II, §  2.
36.  For example,  the  majority in INS  v.  Chad/a, 462  U.S.  919,  924,  953  n.16  (1983),
characterized  the power to waive a statutory requirement in a specific case where "extreme
hardship" was determined as an executive power, while Justice Powell characterized it as a
judicial one. Id.  at 960 (Powell, J., concurring).
37.  I emphasize that my concern here is with conceptualization,  not reality.
38.  This is only a sense, or what literary theorists might call an "elective affinity." The
Venezuelan  constitutional  scholar Allan R.  Brewer-Carias has argued in great detail that
essentially every design choice can fit into both the common law and the civilian traditions.
See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARtAS,  JUDIcIAL REVIEW  IN COMPARATIVE  LAW 128, 186 (1989).
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that the government  they establish will have  to face  a number of
specific  questions (varying, of course,  from nation to nation). And
constitution  makers  will have  different  views  on what  the right
resolution of those questions should be. They will therefore  specu-
late about whether one or another constitutional design choice will
make it more or less likely that their position on those contentious,
immediate questions will prevail.s9
These speculations will shape the design choices they make--or
on which they compromise. Perhaps this is a point at which advice
givers might profitably  intervene with some suggestions. Suppose
one politically significant group prefers design choice A over design
choice  B, which  an  opposing group  supports. Because the  groups
have  settled  on  design  choices  with  an  eye  toward  the  conse-
quences-the first group thinks that it is going to win more under
choice  A  than  B,  while  the  other  makes  exactly  the  reverse
prediction-they might get stuck. An advice giver might offer them
design choice C, observing that each has a "good enough" chance to
prevail on a range of important issues under  C,4° that overcoming
the current impasse between A and B is really important to them,
and  that-perhaps  after  the  constitution  is  adopted--each  side
can  try  to  manipulate  structure  C  to  gain  a  more  permanent
advantage.41 Here, the advice giver acts as a problem solver, offering
possible solutions to people  who might not be  able to devise their
own  solutions  because  they are  blinded  by  their  prior commit-
ments.42
I would not rule out this role for normative advice  giving, but I
would emphasize several of its characteristics. First, the claim that
39.  Again, I emphasize that long-term considerations drop out of the calculation because
the constitution makers do not know what issues the nation will face in the future, or what
their positions would be on those unknown issues, or how particular design choices will affect
the  outcomes  of those  issues.  See  LUTZ,  supra note  5,  at  94-95  (noting  the  imperfect
information faced by constitution makers and the conflict between short-term and long-term
interests).
40.  I  draw  the term from  BRUNO  BETTELHEIM,  A  GOOD  ENOUGH  PARENT:  A BOOK  ON
CHILD-REARING  (1987), without intending to endorse anything other than the idea that doing
well enough is often better than trying to do the best that one hopes for.
41.  See  LUTZ,  supra note  5,  at  225;  see  also Alicia  L.  Bannon,  Note,  Designing a
Constitution-Drafting  Process: Lessons  from  Kenya,  116  YALE  L.J.  1824,  1849  (2007)
(discussing ex post changes to Kenya's constitutional review process).
42.  Innovations in constitutional  design, such as those mentioned in note  7, supra,  are
candidates for this form of advice giving.
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each side has a good enough chance to prevail has to be credible to
both sides.43 In some settings, one side might be quite skeptical,4
particularly when it  sees its adversary buying into the proposal. 45
Second,  overcoming  the impasse  has  to  be  more important  than
maintaining the status quo. This will not always be so. Third, and
probably most important for present purposes, choice  C has to be
something that the contending parties would not come up with on
their  own.  It  must  be  something  outside  their  initial  vision  of
possible  design  choices.  And  here,  I  think,  there  may  be  two
difficulties. I wonder whether there are any such choices in today's
world. Political actors involved in the constitution-making process
already have, I believe, quite a wide vision. It is unclear to me what
an outsider  can offer.46  In addition, the very fact that a choice  is
offered by an outsider might have either good effects-because the
idea comes from a neutral as between the contending forces-or bad
ones.  The bad effects  would  arise  when  outsiders are  viewed  as
partisan (notwithstanding the subjective views of the outsiders). 47
An example is provided by the question, which all contemporary
constitutional  designers  must confront,  of the legislature's  size.4"
From early on it has been clear that a legislature should be neither
too large nor too small, because in either case the legislative process
is likely to be dominated by a small group-in the latter case by the
entire small legislature, and in the former by the leadership  group
that will  inevitably  emerge  to  manage  the  massive  legislature's
43.  See Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign  Constitution-Making  and Its Pathology  in Iraq,  51
N.Y.L. SCH.  L. REV.  534, 542 (2006-2007) ('ITihe paradigm of constitution-making depends
on the coordination and the compliance  of many instances, and of course mutual trust ....").
44.  See id. at 548 (noting the mistrust among groups while drafting the Iraqi constitution).
45.  The thought would be something like this: If my adversaries think they have a good
enough chance to prevail, perhaps they know something I don't about how this institution will
operate. I think I have a good enough chance to prevail, but maybe they are right in thinking
that they have a better chance-in which case I ought to withhold my consent.
46.  There will often be domestic legal experts that constitution drafters  call upon, who
may share much of the knowledge that external advisors possess.
47.  I believe that some participants involved  in contemporary post-conflict constitution-
making projects are unlikely to consider any advice from an American as neutral-even when
the advice is from a scholar formally unaffiliated with the government  of the United States.
See, e.g., Arato, supra  note 43, at 457-58 (discussing the "pathology of illegitimacy" resulting
from the American influence during the construction of Iraq's interim constitution).
48.  See LUTZ, supra  note 5, at 221 (noting that empirical evidence suggests legislature size
has some "underlying logic").
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operations.49  It  also seems to be an empirically verifiable fact that
legislative size tends to be a close approximation of the cube root of
a  nation's  population. 5 0  I  suspect  that an  external  advisor  who
recommended that the legislature's size be set at that figure would
be regarded as a lunatic."' Still, sometimes an advisor observing the
course  of discussions of legislative  size might  observe that those
discussions seemed to be converging on a figure far removed from
the cube  root of the nation's population. The  advisor might point
out that other constitution designers seemed to think the proposed
size  was  too  small  or too  large.  Note  as well  that the cube-root
"guideline" is  not  something  that  is  likely  to  jump  out  during
deliberations, nor is it  likely to be common knowledge."  Thus, the
external advisor's comment might push the constitution makers to
modify their positions.
Still, it  seems worth  noting that the  drafters  almost certainly
would be converging on a "mis-sized" legislature for local political
reasons, and that bringing the cube-root guideline into the discus-
sion would probably give some participants  a new argument for the
positions  they had already been asserting.5 3  Further, as Professor
Lutz  notes,  the  cube-root  guideline  appears  to be  a natural out-
growth  of  deliberations  over  legislative  size,  not  a  rationally
prescribed rule.54 He explains that "those who design constitutions
unconsciously struggle  toward a similar sense of what is fair and
workable  in a constitutional  republic." 55  Bringing this knowledge
into consciousness might impair its utility in the design process.56
49.  Id.  at 101-02.
50.  See id. (describing the evidence).
51.  See id. at 233 ("There is no inherent rationality to following the cube root rule.").
52.  See id. at 102.
53.  See id. at 233-34.
54.  See id. at 233.
55.  Id.  at  102  (emphasis  added);  see also  id.  at  234  (describing  the outcome  as  "an
impressively consistent logic-in-use").
56.  Lutz provides similar examples, subject to similar comments. He observes that short
constitutions tend to be difficult to amend because they are "simple framework document[s],"
while  long  constitutions  tend  to  be  easier  to  amend  because  they  contain  detailed
prescriptions that can be made obsolete by social and economic developments. Id.  at 222-23.
From this we might derive the prescription: "Make your constitution relatively easy to amend
if you are moving in the direction of a long constitution." I suspect that this is a common sense
prescription. Even if it is something that an advisor can bring to a designer's attention, it tells
them almost nothing about exactly how easy amendment should be.
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The  most  general  of  my  points  is  this:  participants  in  the
constitution-making process have goals that partially converge and
partially diverge."  With varying degrees of commitment, they want
to get a constitution adopted. Then, with the constitution in place,
they want their own particular policies to be adopted. With respect
to  each component  of constitutional  design, each participant  will
make some judgment about the degree to which a particular design
will  make  more  or  less  likely  that its  preferred  policies  will  be
adopted.  What  can  an  outside  advisor  contribute  to  the  design
process? Advice to one participant that a  design feature that has
been  overlooked  will  increase  the  chance  that  the  participant's
preferred policy will be adopted actually is unhelpful because that
very thing makes the feature less attractive to other participants.
Sometimes  the  advisor  might  be  able  to  identify  a  design
alternative  that makes  it  less likely than the alternatives  on the
table that any participant will achieve what it wants, but nonethe-
less makes  it  possible for  each  participant to  anticipate winning
what it wants with some probability. This kind of advice might be
helpful  when  achieving  an  agreement  is  more  desirable  than
ensuring substantive outcomes after the constitution is adopted. It
is not that the feature is a component of good government in some
general sense but rather that its adoption will solve an immediate
political problem without guaranteeing future political defeats.58
Yet,  to  the  extent  that  politics  is  what  matters,  present  and
future, I am quite skeptical about the proposition that outsiders will
be able to improve on the calculations internal participants already
make. Perhaps they can bring into the discussion facts about how
design features are likely to work, which will assist the participants
in their political calculations. Also, perhaps those facts will not be
common  knowledge,  and the  participants  will  actually  take  the
outsider's factual presentation seriously. The conditions for success
seem to me rather restrictive, though.
A final perspective  on the problems discussed here  comes from
thinking  about  the  implications  of  a  quite  minimalist  view  of
constitutionalism's  requirements.  Under  this  minimalist  view,
constitutionalism requires only "(a) regular, open, and competitive
57.  See id. at 225.
58.  See Arato, supra note 43, at 538.
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elections; (b) freedoms of speech and press; and (c) well-functioning,
relatively independent courts." 59 It seems clear that these require-
ments can be met by a huge number of institutional designs, that a
large number of those institutional designs are common knowledge
among all constitution designers, and that these requirements  can
be  met only  when there is political  support for constitutionalism
itself. In  other  words,  if the  political  system  is  ready  to  accept
constitutionalism,  the particulars  of constitutional  design do  not
matter, and so neither will normative constitutional advice giving.
Similarly,  if the  political  system  is  not ready  to  accept  consti-
tutionalism, the particulars of constitutional design do not matter,
and neither will normative constitutional advice giving.
As Learned  Hand said, "Liberty lies in the hearts  of men  and
women;  when  it  dies there, no constitution,  no law, no court can
save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help
it."'6  In the United States, Hand's comment is typically offered as a
caution against relying too heavily on judicial review as a mecha-
nism for avoiding the implementation  of unconstitutional  legisla-
tion. Hand, however, was addressing constitutionalism itself, and
perhaps all I have done is flesh out some reasons for thinking that
he was right.
III. PROBLEMS WITH ADVICE ABOUT PROCESS
I turn now  from  choices  with  respect to  the institutions  of an
ongoing political system to choices with respect to the constitution-
making process itself.  At a fairly high level of abstraction, the advice
is straightforward: Design the process of constitution making and
adoption to ensure that all elites representing political forces  with
significant  amounts  of power-mostly  power to  disrupt arrange-
ments of which they disapprove-end  up committed to expending a
reasonable amount of effort to make the arrangements work after
they  go  into effect.6'  I  will call  this  ensuring  buy-in  by political
59.  VICKI C. JACKSON  & MARK TUSHNET,  COMPARATIVE  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  459-60 (2d
ed. 2006).
60.  LEARNED  HAND,  The  Spirit of  Liberty, in  THE  SPIRIT  OF  LIBERTY:  PAPERS  AND
ADDRESSES  OF LEARNED  HAND  189, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
61.  See BREWER-CARfAS, supra  note 38, at 63 (noting that the U.S. Constitution rose from
a series of compromises between the ruling classes and the interests of democracy).
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elites. Secondarily,  the advice is:  Do what you can to  get similar
buy-in from the population generally.62
Of  course,  the  difficulty  lies  in  giving  more  content  to  these
prescriptions.  The  mechanisms  of gaining  elite buy-in  are  quite
varied. Discussion in parliament, extra-parliamentary round table
negotiations, and development of constitutional drafts by experts for
discussion in a constituent assembly, which itself can be selected in
a wide variety of ways, are just a few of the available mechanisms. 63
Under  some  arrays  of political  power,  almost  anything  will  do.
Under others, perhaps  only one or two mechanisms  will produce
sufficient  buy-in.  The  particular  institutional  mechanism  for
eliciting  elite  buy-in  will  depend  quite  heavily  on  the  array  of
political forces on the ground."
Consider,  for  example,  two  common  situations.  In  the  first
situation-call it revolutionary transformation-the political elites,
who previously controlled the nation, have been decisively defeated
and have lost all political power. The most obvious example occurred
in the  United  States,  where  the  loyalist supporters  of  the prior
regime fled the new nation in droves. 65  In such a situation, revolu-
tionary  leaders  will  bargain  among  themselves, 6 6  and  will  be
unlikely  to  welcome,  or  even  need,  anything  other  than  expert
advice  on technical details. 67
62.  Buy-in by both elites and the population  is likely to be increasingly difficult as the
degree of heteronomy increases.  See  LUTZ,  supra note  5,  at 14  (noting the importance  of
popular consent).
63.  Under what I suspect are unusual circumstances,  elite buy-in might occur by means
of ratification of an expert-drafted constitution in a popular referendum. See Arato, supra  note
43, at 540.
64.  For an  argument that recent developments  in constitution  making have created  a
better model for eliciting the necessary buy-in, see id. at 539-40. Arato acknowledges that the
model rests on a relatively small number of cases, and I would add that the apparent failure
of the constitution-making process in Iraq seems to have multiple parents.
65.  GORDON  S. WOOD,  THE AMERICAN  REVOLUTION: A  HISTORY  113 (Modern Library ed.
2002).
66.  See BREWER-CARtAS,  supra  note 38, at 63 (noting that the U.S. Constitution resulted
from compromises among the former colonies).
67.  By "technical details," I  mean such things as  ensuring that the terms used  in one
provision are compatible with the terms used in another (whether compatibility lies in using
the same terms or deliberately using different ones), that electoral timetables are coordinated
in the way the drafters truly desire, and the like.
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In the  other  common  situation,  elements  of the  prior  regime
retain  significant  power  and  must  be  accommodated.  Here  the
negotiations will have to include these elements, as in South Africa
and the roundtable negotiations in Central and Eastern Europe in
the  early  1990s.68  This  is  also  the  case  with  many  nominally
imposed constitutions, such as the one used to absorb the German
Democratic  Republic (GDR) into the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG). 9 The FRG had to accommodate some matters of concern to
the population in the former GDR, even though the GDR's political
collapse  was  complete.  In  Japan,  elite  buy-in  appears  to  have
occurred through the process of getting the Japanese parliament to
endorse-as truly Japanese-the translation of an American-drafted
constitution. °
The  examples  of Germany  and Japan suggest the  difficulty  of
moving  more  than  a  step  or  two  away  from  the  most  general
prescriptions. I doubt that anyone would have thought, before the
event, that it would matter as much as it  seems to have mattered
that the Japanese parliament had to translate the draft constitution
from English.71  Imagine  a conversation within the U.S. occupying
forces:  'We've drafted a constitution in English. Let's translate  it
into  Japanese  and then  secure  buy-in  by  having  the  Japanese
themselves ratify the constitution." Would anyone have thought to
say, 'Wait a  minute.  We  can  get better buy-in  by having them
translate it themselves."? Translation, which certainly looks like a
mainly technical enterprise, turned out to be politically significant
in ways  that  a normative  advice  giver  probably  would not have
anticipated.72
Getting  popular buy-in  is,  as  I  have suggested,  secondary.  Its
absence will matter only if some political leader sees an opportunity
for political gain in appealing to members of the public who would
68.  See Arato, supra note 43, at 538.
69.  On  the  integration  of  the  German  Democratic  Republic  (GDR)  and  the  Federal
Republic  of  Germany  (FRG),  see  Inga  Markovits,  Constitution Making After  National
Catastrophes:  Germany in 1949 and 1990, 49 WM.  & MARY L. REv.  1307 (2008).
70.  That is how I  interpret the narrative offered in RAYA. MOORE &  DONALD  L. ROBINSON,
PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY:  CRAFTING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER MACARTHUR  116-18
(2002).
71.  See id.
72.  See id.
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have not bought in. In the short run, if political elites have bought
in, the chance that such a leader will emerge is small, though not
zero. The opportunist leader may have been biding his or her time,
or may have  explicitly  refused to  buy in to the  new constitution
precisely to preserve the possibility of mobilizing the public against
it. That the possibility is not zero counsels in favor of gaining public
buy-in; that the possibility is likely to be small counsels in favor of
not expending enormous energy on doing so. 3
Indeed, that seems to be the pattern. Modern constitution making
appears to require  some form of popular ratification of a proposed
constitution.7 4 The ratification may take the form of an up-or-down
referendum.  An  alternative,  recent  practice  in  several  nations,
including South Africa, has been widely admired by commentators.75
A constitution is drafted by experts and debated and modified by a
mechanism  that  aims  at  ensuring  elite  buy-in.  The  proposed
constitution is then widely circulated throughout the nation, with
significant  efforts  made to  educate  the public about its content.76
There are public discussions and some means by which members of
the public can submit comments and suggestions for modification. 77
These suggestions are considered by some elite-dominated body, and
then the constitution, put in final form, is submitted to the public
for ratification.78
73.  See Bannon, supra  note 41, at 1842, 1848 (summarizing the lessons learned from the
drafting process in Kenya).
74.  See JACKSON &  TUSHNET,  supra  note 59, at 288-89. 1 note here the mixed pattern with
respect to  the proposed  Treaty for  a Constitution for  Europe.  Some  nations regarded  the
proposal  as  a  treaty, which  it  was  in  form,  and  used  their  regular  methods  of treaty
ratification, that is, endorsement by the national legislature. Others regarded it as a proposed
constitution,  and sought popular ratification in referenda, even in nations where referenda
are not a normal mode  of law making. EU Constitution: Where Member States Stand, BBC
NEWS,  Mar.  25,  2007,  available at  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3954327.stm;  The
Constitution  Ratification,  http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty
_ConstRat.htm  (last visited Feb.  21,  2008).  I  have qualified my assertion with the word
"modern" to take into account the U.S. experience of ratification by special popularly elected
assemblies in the states. Even there, the special elections generated some degree of popular
buy-in.
75.  For some sources, see JACKSON & TUSHNET,  supra  note 59, at 287-89.
76.  See id. at 283, 287-88 (discussing the process in South Africa).
77.  See id. at 287-88.
78.  See id. at 277 (noting that constitutional referenda appear to be gaining in popularity).
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These  mechanisms  do  obtain  some  degree  of public  buy-in  at
relatively  low  cost. 9  The  consultative  processes  have,  I  believe,
generally resulted in no more than cosmetic changes to the proposed
constitution.  And the up-or-down  referenda  have been,  I believe,
basically rubber stamps. 5s  These outcomes are entirely expectable.
The  initial  constitutions,  whether  submitted  to the  consultative
process  or placed  on the ballot  directly, result from  negotiations
among  political  elites.  If they have  truly bought  into their  own
proposals,  they will  be willing to  make only  cosmetic  changes  to
their work.s l Indeed, they are likely to campaign for the ratification
of their work."s  What  makes  them  political  elites  is  that, as  a
general  matter, they can get their way  in politics.  "As a  general
matter" is not the same as "always," though, and there is an ever-
present  possibility  of slippage  between  the  political  elites  who
negotiated the proposed constitution and the public that is asked to
ratify it. Here too, it is doubtful that an external advice giver will be
in  an  especially  good  position--compared  to  a  domestic  analyst
-both  to observe slippage occurring and to caution, effectively, the
political elites against the course they are pursuing."
Before concluding, I think it useful to bring to the fore one theme
in the preceding argument that deserves specific mention. Perhaps
79.  Public  buy-in  can come  gradually,  as  the nation's  political  experience  generates
confidence among the public that the original institutional design works reasonably well. Of
course, governmental failures early on may lead the public to conclude that the constitution
was badly designed from the outset. See id. at 290.
80.  See  id.  at 288. But  see Bannon,  supra note  41,  at  1845,  1869-70  (describing the
rejection by referendum of a proposed constitutional revision in Kenya). My interpretation of
the events Bannon describes is that the constitutional revision did not have sufficiently broad
elite  buy-in,  and  became  a  vehicle  for the  entrenchment  of one  of the  opposing  forces
participating in the revision process.
81.  Making  some  changes  is  probably  a  good  idea.  This  shows  the  public  that  the
consultation actually had some effect, albeit a modest one. The changes, however, are likely
to be cosmetic because  the elites will have already bought in to resolutions  of their  major
differences  and  will  be  unlikely  to  want  to  reopen  the  discussions  of important  and
contentious matters.
82.  See Bannon, supra  note 41, at 1845 (discussing a government campaign for ratification
in Kenya).
83.  Here  my formulation  is  designed  to deal with situations  in which external  advice
givers  see a train  wreck about to occur (that is, observe  the slippage  as it  occurs),  and to
express skepticism about the efficacy of pointing out to the elites that the train wreck is about
to occur unless they change their course. See Arato, supra  note 43, at 547; Bannon, supra  note
41,  at 1864-65.
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an  outsider  can  give  advice,  not  on  constitutional  substance  or
processes  for  constitutional  adoption,  but  on  the  processes  for
reaching agreement. Advisors who know something about negotia-
tion, bargaining,  and the like might be able to move  negotiations
forward,  acting essentially as mediators do in nonjudicial  dispute
resolution processes.  To the extent that the demand for advice  is
based on an interest in gaining legitimacy from consulting experts
in constitutional  law,  the  advisors  must have  that expertise  as
well.84  Whether  specialists  in  constitutional  law  as  such  have
expertise as mediators is a separate question.85
CONCLUSION
I have sketched some reasons for skepticism about the proposition
that external  observers  can  offer  normative  advice  to  guide  the
"reason and choice" of contemporary constitution makers. Perhaps
some negative recommendations are possible. I wonder whether the
recommendations  deal with matters of common knowledge among
constitutional  drafters  and  whether  the  advice  will  be  taken in
circumstances where bad ideas are on the table.
Consider  two  such  recommendations.  The  first is  that  it  is  a
dramatically bad idea to have a parliamentary system in which the
prime  minister  is  elected  independently  of  the  parliamentary
majority.8"  The second is that it  is a pretty bad idea to combine  a
84.  See Bannon, supra note 41, at 1865-66.
85.  Bannon's  note deserves  special mention here. See id. The  author provides  a careful
analysis of the politics associated with the failed constitution-drafting process in Kenya. She
identifies the political interests that were accommodated in the drafting process and explains
how  the  accommodations  that were  reached  contributed  to  the  process's  failures.  She
concludes with a series of recommendations that, if followed, might have led to a successful
outcome. Her argument is carefully qualified but would be strengthened  had she recognized
the self-defeating  character of her recommendations.  For  example, she  recommends  that
national politicians be excluded  from the drafting process. Id.  at 1866-67.  Sometimes that
might  be possible, but in the circumstances  she describes,  there were political  reasons for
their inclusion in the process. And, if a renewed process  does exclude politicians, it  will be
because the contours of politics have changed, not because "reason and choice" dictate their
exclusion.
86.  Israel tried this for one election cycle and then abandoned the experiment. Compare
Basic  Law:  The  Government  §  3(b),  1992,  S.H.  1396,  at  214,  available at http://www.
mfa.gov.il/MFAIMFAArchive/1990-1995/Basic%2OLaw-%2OThe%20-Government%20-1992-
('The Prime Minister  serves by virtue  of his being elected in the national general  elections,
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strong president with an independently elected parliament chosen
through proportional representation with a relatively low threshold
for participation in parliament.  The difficulties with these designs
are either obvious from the start, as with the separate election of a
prime minister, which gives perverse incentives to voters concerned
about the aggregation of power in one person's or party's hands, or
from widely known experience.
Beyond the question of common knowledge,  though, one has to
wonder  what  the  political  circumstances  are  that  produce  an
interest among political elites in advancing these bad ideas. Take
the presidentialism scenario for example. The proposal might be on
the table because  there is one faction with a substantial plurality
and a strong leader, and many other factions. The plurality faction
may push for a strong presidency, anticipating that its leader, who
genuinely  does  tower  above  other  politicians,  will  be  chosen  as
president. The other factions may want proportional representation
in the legislature. Will the constitution drafters heed the advice that
they are  moving toward a bad  design? Perhaps. But the  political
situation  I have  described,  for example, will not change,  and the
drafters will search for close substitutes: a strong president with one
or more independently  elected  vice-presidents  who  must approve
major actions, for example. Yet, I am reasonably confident that, in
the posited political circumstances, institutional variants that might
be politically acceptable  substitutes for the strong presidency are
going to pose some of the same dangers and perhaps even to almost
exactly the same degree.
Negative recommendations  have their own  peril. The intuition
behind such recommendations is that the drafters of one constitu-
tion can learn from other people's  mistakes. Indeed, this is true, in
the sense that they do not make the same  mistakes other people
to be conducted  on a direct, equal, and secret basis .... "),  with Basic Law: The Government,
2001,  S.H.  1780,  at  158,  available at  http://www.knesset.gov.il/aws/special/eng/basicl4
_eng.htm  (omitting that provision).
87.  This is the lesson taught by Juan Linz's studies of presidentialism in Latin America.
See  generally JUAN  J.  LINZ  &  ARTURO  VALENZUELA,  THE  FAILURE  OF  PRESIDENTIAL
DEMOCRACY:  COMPARATIVE  PERSPECTIVES  (1994).  Sometimes  the  lesson  is  stated  more
broadly, as a proposition about presidentialism as such, or about combining presidentialism
with  a  parliamentary  system.  The  U.S.  experience  shows  that the  former  version  is
overstated; the French experience shows that the latter is overstated.
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have  made.  Instead,  they  make  their  own  new  mistakes.  For
example,  they might forgo  an institutional  design  on the ground
that it worked badly elsewhere, when it might work reasonably well
in one's own political circumstances. Accepting negative recommen-
dations, that is, might be as bad as accepting positive ones.
To restate my overall theme: institutional design results far more
from  on-the-ground  political circumstances  than from reason and
choice.88  Normative  advice  giving  might occasionally  have  some
beneficial  effects,  but in general  the advice will be  dominated by
politics. In our capacity as scholars, we are better off observing what
happens as constitutions are designed and implemented and trying
to  figure  out  why  what  happens  happens,  rather  than  offering
normative advice on good constitutional design. 89
88.  See LUTZ, supra note 5, at 3.
89.  Some  scholars  are  participants  in processes  of constitutional  design  and  should
participate  as  political  actors  in those  processes.  At this point,  of course,  the  argument
becomes  entirely reflexive:  scholars  offering normative design  advice are intervening  in  a
political process as political  actors. Perhaps, then, all that I am asking is that such scholars
be aware that their interventions are political and not merely technical.
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